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Notes
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-FEASIBILITY AND ABANDONMENT OF
THE ORIGINAL PLAN-A housing corporation, although only ac-
quiring seventy of the one hundred ninety-two lots in the total
area, purchased all the lots fronting on the street in question. In
pursuance of a general plan, the great majority of the deeds pro-
vided that any building erected must be set back fifteen feet from
the front property line. Although defendant's deed did not con-
tain such restriction, the original, from which his title was de-
rived, did. Plaintiffs, whose deeds contained these restrictions,
sued to enjoin defendant from erecting an addition to his business
establishment which contemplated a violation of the restriction.
Held, injunction granted. Alfortish v. Wagner, 7 So. (2d) 708
(La. 1942).
Building restrictions have been recognized and enforced in
Louisiana by resort to the law of equitable restrictions running
with the land, which give rise to equitable defenses.1 These re-
strictions may be enforced by anyone within the restricted area
who has property near enough to be affected thereby.2 The de-
fendant in the instant case, necessarily admitting the above legal
principles, urged several defenses, 3 the consideration of which
will be the purpose of this note.
The first defense was that the original plan was not feasible
because the housing corporation did not own all of the property
in the area. The court found that the argument, although it might
have been forceful as to the other squares, was not convincing
since all of the lots in the square in question did contain these
restrictions. Concerning this problem of the feasibility of the
plan, there have been very few controversies.4 This is explained
by the experience of the planners of the areas who, unless un-
1. Note (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 329. An excellent discussion of the
cases leading to the acceptance of this doctrine by the court.-
2. Hill v. Ross, 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928); Edwards v. Wiseman, 198
La. 382, 3 So. (2d) 661 (1941).
3. Since the law of equitable restrictions has a common law background,
the authorities from the other states will be of necessary importance.
4. Several early cases were concerned with whether or not a general plan
was contemplated. See Hano v. Bigelow, 155 Mass. 341, 29 N.E. 628 (1892);
Frink v. Hughes, 133 Mich. 63, 94 N.W. 601 (1903); Allen v. City of Detroit,
167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 890 (1911); Velie v. Richardson,
126 Minn. 334, 148 N.W. 286 (1914); Coates v. Cullingford, 147 App. Div. 39,
131 N. Y. Supp. 700 (1911).
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foreseen events interfere,5 will hardly conceive of an arrange-
ment that is not practical. As a result, the only generalization
possible as to the requisites of a feasible plan must proceed by an
analogy to those cases dealing with other aspects of this problem,
i.e., building restrictions in general. Accordingly, for a plan to be
considered as feasible, it seems that the grantor must own a suffi-
cient number of lots on that particular plot as intimated by the
instant case; that the lots be large enough to contain buildings
which do not violate the restrictions;' that the area be suited to
the type of plan conceived by the originator7 that the value of
the property will not be decreased unreasonably thereby; 8 and
in general, that such conditions exist as to make the plan both
desirable and workable.
The defendant's next contention was that the plan had been
abandoned. Two conditions were pointed out in support of this
view; first, the failure of the restriction to appear in all of the
deeds, and second, a change in the neighborhood.
Courts, in considering the failure of the restrictions to appear
in some of the deeds, generally inquire as to the effect of this
condition upon the original plan.9 Abandonment is said to depend
upon the proportionate number of deeds that do not contain the
restrictions.10 The plan is considered efficacious where the omis-
sions in some deeds are necessary" or are designed to make the
arrangement more desirable."2 The fact that the common grantor
had conveyed deeds in an adjoining area without the restrictions
seems to be of little importance. 3
5. In Lemmon v. Wineland, 255 Mich. 90, 237 N.W. 527 (1931), part of the
property was condemned for the widening of the street thus making the lot
too small within which to build if the restrictions were enforced. It was
held that the plan was not feasible.
6. Lemmon v. Wineland, 255 Mich. 90, 237 N.W. 527 (1931).
7. Elrod v. Phillips, 214 N.C. 472, 199 S.E. 722 (1938).
8. Cevasco v. Westwood Homes, 128 N.J.Eq. 53, 15 A. (2d) 140 (1940).
9. Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 N.E. 936 (1901); Sailer v. Podolski,
82 N.J. Eq. 459, 88 Atl. 967 (1913).
10. }iano v. Bigelow, 155 Mass. 341, 29 N.E. 628 (1892); Bacon v. Sand-
berg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 N.E. 936 (1901). In both cases only two lots did not
have restrictions. In Beach v. Jenkins, 174 App. Div. 813, 159 N.Y. Supp. 652
(1916), twenty lots out of two hundred fifty did not have the restrictions.
In Sailer v. Podolski, 82 N.J. Eq. 459, 88 Atl. 967 (1913), where fifteen out of
the thirty-three lots did not have the restrictions, the court held that there
was no general plan or scheme although all six lots on the avenue where
plaintiff's and defendant's lots were located did contain the restrictions. (It
is submitted that since the court was considering the existence of a plan and
not the feasibility of one, it is distinguishable from the present case.)
11. Hooper v. Lottman, 171 S.W. 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
12. Setchal v. Lawrence, 121 Misc. 359, 201 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1923).
13. See Bohm v. Silberstein, 220 Mich. 228, 229, 189 N.W. 889, 901 (1922).
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The most usual form of abandonment occurs where the area
changes 4 so as not to afford the original protection contem-
plated,15 or so as to practically destroy the essential objects and
purposes of the restrictions.18 The change may be complete 7 so
that the plan cannot possibly be carried out in an equitable man-
ner.18 The restrictions may be obsolete19 or their value substan-
tially destroyed.20 The person complaining must show that he
had purchased the lot prior to the change,2' and that the change
has neutralized the benefits of the restrictions, 22 or that the
changes are radical and fundamental. 2 Another problem occurs
when the expansion of a city and the spread of industry alters
the community so that the character of the property within24 or
without 2 5 the subdivision undergoes a substantial change. The
courts consider this an abandonment. 28
At this point, it may be well to consider some problems with
regard to an abandonment of a plan other than those raised by
the defendant in the instant case. Abandonment must be shown
14. Whether or not a change constitutes an abandonment of the plan is a
question to be decided upon the facts of each case. Taylor Avenue Improve-
ment Ass'n v. Detroit Trust Co., 283 Mich. 304, 278 N.W. 75 (1938); Southwest
Petroleum Co. v. Logan, 180 Okla. 477, 71 P. (2d) 759 (1937).
15. Bickell v. Moraio, 117 Conn. 176, 167 Atl. 722 (1933); Fidelity Title &
Trust Co. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 125 Conn. 373, 5 A. (2d) 700 (1939).
16. Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 88 A.L.R. 394 (1933); Bach-
man v. Colpaert Realty Corp., 194 N.E. 783 (Ind. App. 1935); Rombauer v.
Compton Heights Christian Church, 40 S.W. (2d) 545 (Mo. 1931); Pickel v.
McCawley, 329 Mo.'166, 44 S.W. (2d) 857 (1931); Wuertenbaecher v. Feik, 43
S.W. (2d) 848 (Mo. App. 1931); Hall v. Koehler, 347 Mo. 658, 148 S.W. (2d)
489 (1941); Pulitzer v. Campbell, 147 Misc. 700, 262 N.Y. Supp. 743 (1933);
Heitkemper v. Schmeer, 146 Ore. 304, 29 P. (2d) 540 (1934); Deituck v. Lead-
better, 175 Va. 170, 8 S.E. (2d) 276, 127 A.L.R. 849 (1940).
17. Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. (2d) 496 (1932). The restric-
tions against negroes were no longer good since the district had become a
negro district. Rombuer v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 40 S.W. (2d)
545 (Mo. 1931).
18. Armstrong v. Leverone, 105 Conn. 464, 136 Atl. 71 (1927); Van Meter
v. Manion, 170 Okla. 1, 38 P. (2d) 557 (1934); Commercial Realty Co. v. Pope,
171 Okla. 331, 43 P. (2d) 62 (1935).
19. Marra v. Aetna Const. Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 375, 101 P. (2d) 490 (1940).
20. Hayslett v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888
(1930).
21. Allen v. Avondale Co., 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938).
22. Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W. (2d) 1024
(1938); Sandusky v. Allsopp, 99 N.J. Eq. 61, 131 Atl. 633 (1926); Humphreys
v. Ibach, 110 N.J. Eq. 647, 160 Atl. 531, 85 A.L.R. 980 (1932).
23. Higgins v. Hough, 195 N.C. 652, 143 S.E. 212 (1928); Stroupe v. Trues-
dell, 196 N.C. 303, 145 S.E. 925 (1928). In Greer v. Bornstein, 246 Ky. 286, 54 S.W.
(2d) 927 (1932), it was said that changes are immaterial unless they interfere
with complainants' enjoyment of the lot or they show an intention to aban-
don the plan.
24. Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W. (2d) 1024
(1938).
25. Elrod v. Phillips, 214 N.C. 472, 199 S.E. 722 (1938).
26. See notes 24 and 25, supra.
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by the clear intent of the property owners generally 27 or by'facts
that reasonably lead to that conclusion.2 8 In cases where the re-
strictions deal with the cost of edifices erected on the property
and the cost of building has so fluctuated so as to make enforce-
ment of the restrictions which are no longer beneficient unreason-
able, the plan is considered abandoned.2 9 But the mere fact that
the property of the bordering 0 or of the restricted2 ' area would
be more valuable for business, or that it would be more valuable
generally if the restrictions were removed,2 does not constitute
an abandonment. The courts usually look to the number of viola-
tions on that particular street3" to determine whether or not there
has been an abandonment, since violations on the other streets
are not pertinent. 4 But to determine the right of a person to vio-
late a restriction because there has been an abandonment of the
plan, the particular lot in question cannot be considered apart
from its relationship to the entire restricted area. 5 As a general
rule, the restrictive covenants will be enforced in equity where
they remain of substantial value despite a hardship on the ser-
vient, estate,'3 unless the evidence indicates that the original pur-
pose cannot be accomplished. 7 The originator of the plan cannot
cause its abandonment by reserving to himself the authority to
modify the restrictions,8 or by failing to put similar restrictions
27. La Fetra v. Beveridge, 124 N.J. Eq. 24, 199 Atl. 70 (1938).
28. Plaster v. Stutzman, 8 S.W. (2d) 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
29. Cevasco v. Westwood Homes, 128 N.J. Eq. 53, 15 A. (2d) 140 (1940);
McComb v. Hanly, 128 N.J. Eq. 316, 16 A. (2d) 74 (1940).
30. Continental Oil Co. v. Fennemore, 38 Ariz. 277, 299 Pac. 132 (1931).
31. Van Meter v. Manion, 170 Okla. 1, 38 P. (2d) 557 (1934); Abernathy
v. Adoue, 49 S.W. (2d) 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
32. Bickell v. Moraio, 117 Conn. 176, 167 Atl. 722 (1933); Reeves v. Com-*
fort, 172 Ga. 331, 157 S.E. 629 (1931); Drexel State Bank of Chicago v. O'Don-
nell, 344 Ill. 173, 176 N.E. 348 (1931); Wineman Realty Co. v. Pelavin, 267
Mich. 594, 255 N.W. 393 (1934); Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian
Church, 40 S.W. (2d) 545 (Mo. 1931); Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W. (2d) 175
(Mo. App. 1939).
33. Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So. (2d) 661 (1941); Barton v.
Slifer, 66 AtI. 899 (N.J. Ch. 1907); Newberry v. Barkalow, 75 N.J. Eq. 128,
71 AtI. 752 (1909).
34. Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 N.J. Eq. 612, 61 At!. 369 (1905); Brode v.
Smith, 118 AtI. 742 (N.J. Ch. 1922).
35. Continental Oil Co. v. Fennemore, 38 Ariz. 277, 299 Pac. 132 (1931);
Van Meter v. Manion, 170 Okla. 1, 38 P. (2d) 557 (1934); Commercial Realty
Co. v. Pope, 171 Okla. 331, 43 P. (2d) 62 (1935).
36. Barton v. Moline Properties, 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935); Rombauer
v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 40 S.W. (2d) 545 (Mo. 1931); Benner v.
Tacony Athletic Ass'n, 328 Pa. 577, 196 Ati. 390 (1938).
37. Taylor Avenue Improvement Ass'n v. Detroit Trust Co., 283 Mich.
304, 278 N.W. 75 (1938); Van Meter v. Manion, 170 Okla. 1, 38 P. (2d) 557
(1934); Commercial Realty Co. v. Pope, 171 Okla. 331, 43 P. (2d) 62 (1935).
38. Franklin v. Elizabeth Realty Co., 202 N.C. 212, 162 S.E. 199 (1932).
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in a subsequent deed 9 unless the original deed stipulates to the
contrary. 0
Although the plan may not have been abandoned, certain
property owners may lose their right to enforce the restrictions.
Such right is lost when there is a general substantial violation of
the restrictions without any protest; 1 but the fact that the in-
dividual complaining did not protest in connection with several
previous violations in a remote part which did not affect him does
not mean that he has lost his right, 2 particularly where the pres-
ent breach affects enjoyment of his home.43 Furthermore, if the
complainant be the adjacent landowner he may still enforce his
rights despite many violations in a more remote part."
The final contention of the defendant in the instant case was
that a zoning ordinance changed the area from residential to com-
mercial property, thus operating as an abandonment of the plan.
The purchaser who acquires property subject to the restriction
acquires a property right that cannot be constitutionally abro-
gated,' 5 provided it in no way threatens or endangers the safety,
health, comfort or general welfare of the community." The ordi-
nance changing the character of the area does not destroy the
39. Donahoe v. Turner, 204 Mass. 274, 90 N.E. 549 (1910); Bailey. v. Jack-
son-Campbell, 191 N.C. 61, 131 S.E. 567 (1926); Franklin v. Elizabeth Realty
Co., 202 N.C. 212, 162 S.E. 199 (1932). In Alamogordo Improvement Co. v.
Prendergast, 45 N.M. 40, 109 P. (2d) 254 (1940), as a result of growth of
the town, new additions to the area took place without restrictions in the
deeds as to the prohibition of liquor establishments. See Thompson v. Glen-
wood Community Club, Inc., 191 Ga. 196, 12 S.E. (2d) 623 (1940), to the effect
that person with a waiver of the restriction in his deed could not be enjoined
from violating same, although the deed stated that the covenants were stipu-
lated in favor of grantor and "every other owner of land in said subdivision."
40. In re Pidgeon's Estate, 152 Misc. 71, 273 N.Y. Supp. 704 (1934).
41. Edwards v Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So. (2d) 661 (1941); Meany v.
Stork, 81 N.J. Eq. 210, 86 Atl. 398 (1913).
42. German v. Chapman, L.R. 7 Ch. Div. 271 (1877); Rogers v. Zwolak,
12 Del. Ch. 200, 110 Atl. 674 (1920); Allen v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins.
Co., 248 Mass. 370, 143 N.E. 499, 33 A.L.R. 669 (1924).
43. Brode v. Smith, 69 N.J. Eq. 619, 118 Atl. 742 (1922).
44. Hill v. Ross, 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928); O'Neill v. Wolff, 338 Ill.
508, 170 N.E. 669 (1930); Bischoff v. Morgan, 236 Mich. 251, 210 N.W. 226
(1926); Kumble v. Jaffee, 100 N.J. Eq. 290, 134 Atl. 673 (1926).
45. Gordon v. Caldwell, 235 Ill. App. 170 (1922); Ludgate v. Somerville,
121 Ore. 643, 256 Pac. 1043, 54 A.L.R. 837 (1927). In Southwest Petroleum Co.
v. Logan, 180 Okla. 477, 71 P. (2d) 759 (1937), it was urged that since
an ordinance is not of equal dignity with a state statute it would not be con-
trary to the United States Constitution. Although a private contract may be
impaired by the ordinance, the state did not so Impair. The court did not
feel it necessary to consider and pass upon the argument.
46. Dolan v. Brown, 338 Ill. 412, 170 N.E. 425 (1930); Gordon v. Caldwell,
235 Ill. App. 170 (1922); Vorenberg v. Bunnell, 257 Mass. 399, 153 N.E. 884,
48 A.L.R. 1431 (1926); Olberding v. Smith, 34 N.E. (2d) 296 (Ohio App. 1934);
Ludgate v. Sommerville, 121 Ore. 643, 256 Pac. 1043, 54 A.L.R. 837 (1927);
Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Ore. 229, 274 Pac. 306 (1929).
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restrictions, 47 but it may nevertheless show a substantial trans-
formation.48 A subsequent zoning ordinance will not prevent en-
forcement of the plan if the development of the area is in sub-
stantial conformity therewith.49 Especially is this true when the
ordinance negatives any idea of interfering with the existing re-
strictions.50
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case, being in
accord with the great weight of American authority, was correctly
decided and the injunction properly issued.
J.C.W.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-INVOLUNTARY HOMICIDE STATUTES-
LOUISIANA CRIMINAL CODE-The defendant, while driving on a
public highway at night, accidentally hit and caused the death of
Robert McCrory. Evidence showed that only one headlight was
burning at the time of the accident and that alcohol was found in
the automobile. The defendant was convicted of the crime of in-
voluntary homicide, as defined by Act 64 of 1930.1 The informa-
tion stated that the defendant caused the death of McCrory "by
the operation and use of a motor vehicle, to-wit: an automobile in
a grossly negligent and grossly reckless manner, 1 ut not wilfully
or wantonly." The defendant argued that the allegation in the
bill that the act was not done wilfully or wantonly is contrary to
the charge of gross negligence and gross recklessness, because to
charge that the act is done in a grossly negligent and grossly reck-
less manner is equivalent to charging that the act was done wil-
fully and wantonly. Held, the words "wilfully" and "wantonly"
are not synonymous with words "negligently" and "recklessly,"
the former implying intention or deliberation and the latter mere
47. Burgess v. Magarian, 214 Iowa 694, 243 N.W. 356 (1932); Goodwin
Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W. (2d) 1024 (1938); Hayslett
v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930).
48. Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W. (2d) 1024
(1938); Hayslett v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888
(1930).
49. Bachman v. Colpaert Realty Corp., 101 Ind. App. 306, 194 N.E. '783
(1935); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Drauver, 183 Okla. 579, 83 P. (2d) 840,
119 A.L.R. 1112 (1938).
50. Castleman v. Avignone, 56 App. D.C. 253, 12 F. (2d) 326 (1926); Bur-
gess v. Magarian, 214 Iowa 694, 243 N.W. 356 (1932); Kramer v. Nelson, 189
Wis. 660, 208 N.W. 252 (1926).
1. La. Act 64 of 1930, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1047] provides that
"any person who, by operation or use of any vehicle in a grossly negligent
or grossly reckless manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, causes the death of
another person, shall be guilty of the crime of involuntary homicide. .. ."
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